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THE COMPLEX NATURE, SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF
CUSTOMARY HUMAN RIGHTS
Jordan J. Paust*
In a realistic and descriptive sense, customary human rights law is a
complex and dynamic legal process profoundly interconnected with
international law more generally and, like the latter, with regional and
domestic legal processes throughout the globe. There are no single sources
or evidences of human rights law; no single set of participants; and no single
arenas or institutional arrangements for the creation, invocation, application,
change or termination of such law. Like all human law, it is full of human
choice and rich in individual and group participation.
One might challenge this reality, for it can have significant consequences
concerning awareness of human rights norms, realistic meaning or content,
remedies, and possible sanction strategies. The reality of human rights law
might function in ways opposed to favored myths, limiting preferences or
biases, and individual psychic needs. Realism more generally (as well as
certain basic human rights) is especially opposed to a rigid state-oriented
positivism and its favored, even dangerous, consequences. Indeed, Realist
orientations to human rights might be threatening to those with a pretense of
power, to those who prefer some unobtainable stability (or perhaps merely
their own specially favored value positions), and to domestic governmental
elites (and those eager to serve them) who are anxious to argue that they
should control both the content and application of law.
Yet, it is precisely the reality of human rights law that the scholarly
observer, the more than sporadically effective practitioner, and the relatively
objective decisionmaker should try to identify, clarify, invoke and apply.
For example, if scholars project merely their personal needs and insecurities
onto perceived processes of customary law, they will miss other needs,
interests, objectives, expectations, and forms of participation and interaffec-
tation. They might be blind to normative detail evident in actual patterns of
expectation, to the actual strength of customary norms, to opportunities for
refinement and change of normative content, to the realities of comprehen-
sive and complex sanction processes, and to opportunities for more effective
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sanction strategies. Similarly, practitioners might be less than effective and
decisionmakers less than objective if the reality of human rights law is partly
hidden by false myth, bias, or muddled thinking. From a realistic perspec-
tive, then, what are the primary components of customary human rights law?
How are these related to the complex and dynamic legal process termed
customary human rights law, to human and institutional participants, to
values claimed or shared, and to conforming and nonconforming behavior?
And what are some of the inhibiting myths or historic errors proffered by
those with a less than realistic orientation?
Despite jurisprudential differences, nearly all agree that customary human
rights law has two primary components which must generally be conjoined:
(1) patterns of practice or behavior, and (2) patterns of legal expectation,
"acceptance" as human rights law, or opinio juris.1 Although some prefer
to stress the importance of one element or the other, both are necessary for
the formation, shaping and continued validity of customary human rights
norms.2 Indeed, they are somewhat familiar and necessary components of
treaty-based human rights law, especially concerning an authoritative and
realistic meaning of treaty-based rights.3
1 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status
as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 61 (1990). Throughout this article, I
rely on and transpose many of the points made in this previous study.
2 See id. at 61-68, and references cited. Opinio may well be the more significant element
and driving force of human rights law, but both patterns are needed. See id. at 60 n.4, 61,
63-64 n.12, 64 & n.13.
' See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23,
1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] ("ordinary meaning," thus necessarily relating to the generally shared meaning
of a term or phrase and to relevant patterns of expectation, opinio about meaning). Id. at
para. 1. ("subsequent practice," thus certain patterns of practice). Id. at para. 3; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMNT]. The United States accepts the Vienna Convention as being
presumptively customary. Maria Frankowska, The United States Should Withdraw Its
Reservations to the Genocide Convention: A Response to Professor Paust's Proposal, 12
MICH J. INT'L L. 141, 144 (1990). The doctrine of desuetude concerning outmoded treaties
also rests on changed patterns of opinio and behavior. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1971); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATION-
AL LAW 266 (2d ed. 1970); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 646, at 1297-98 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (implied consent and conduct). Similarly, the
primacy of a new norm of jus cogens will involve new opinio and practice and a change of
treaty obligations (perhaps even a voiding of the entire treaty). See Vienna Convention, supra
art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347.
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It would seem strange then to argue that human obligations derive from
practice, even stable patterns of practice, and not also opinio. Stranger still
would be a jurisprudential insistence that past practice as such is necessarily
determinative of future practice or that it is far more important than human
demands and expectations either as a reliable predictor of future practice or
in shaping future attitudes and behavior.4  A realistic inquiry should
demonstrate that both are relevant and influential, that they are often
interconnected even as they clash or create tensions and interstimulating
patterns.5 If anything, opinio would seem to be more significant in shaping
attitudes and behavior, but they are ultimately intertwined and are parts of
the whole. The very effort to identify past patterns of practice alone and
then to turn this into a "normative" projection for the future,6 is, at best, an
effort at self-deception or the deception of others. It confuses supposedly
isolated practice and the "normative," perhaps even confusing choice about
what was with both the "is" and "ought" of human rights law."
To pretend that relevant patterns of human "practice" are more "real,"
"solid," or "hard" than empirically demonstrable patterns of human
expectation is equally bizarre The existence of each set of patterns at any
given social moment is a fact, as is their existence, change or nonexistence
through time. The discovery and description of each requires human
perception and choice, and conclusions about one set of relevant patterns are
4 For viewpoints approaching this extreme, see, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 88-89, 107 (1989). Curiously, their theory stresses the opinio or consensual
aspects of "general principles" of domestic law without requiring as serious an inquiry into
patterns of practice as they would with respect to customary law. See id. at 102, 104-05, 107.
Clearly, however, patterns of opinio and practice should both be relevant with respect to the
identification and clarification of general principles of law. Without generally conforming
behavior, such "principles" are at best demands and/or expectations and are not principles of
"law". It is also interesting that Philip Alston had already written that there is "a large and
growing body of evidence" that much of the Universal Declaration is customary law. See
Philip Alston, The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Passe or Alive and Universal,
31 REVIEW 60, 69 (Int'l Comm'n Jurists ed., 1982), quoted in Hurst Hannum, The Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 287, 324 (1995-96).
5 See generally Paust, supra note 1, at 61-68, 72-77.
6 See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 89.
7 See also Jordan J. Paust, The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Jurisprudential
Views of Hart, Kelsen, and McDougal-Lasswell, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 9, 24-26 passim (1979).
s See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 88-89.
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not inherently more "objective" or "empirically" derivable than conclusions
about the other.9 To "thingify"10 practice and to pretend that it is always
"carefully" (a word necessarily implying human volition) hammered out in
actual interactions,11 but that opinio juris never is, is unreal in at least two
respects: (1) in assuming that patterns of practice are always carefully
hammered out, and (2) in assuming that patterns of human demand and
expectation are necessarily less influenced by processes of interaction and are
always somehow magically less "careful." Each is real and each can be
"solid" or "soft," intense or weak, and widely or narrowly shared or extant.
The main point is that each set of patterns should be measured as
objectively as possible for a comprehensive and realistic awareness of
customary human rights law. If there is a core of settled meaning,"
measure it. If around this core there are other possible meanings at or
toward the edge which allow room for experimentation and growth within
the contours of a human rights norm, identify and clarify these." If new
opinio or practice has torn the core apart, measure this also. Instead of
imagined tensions between conceptions of opinio and practice, measure real
tensions and interconnections with respect to actual patterns of opinio and
practice. It is no criticism of customary human rights law that some papered
aspiration is not widely expected to be legally relevant or required or that
general patterns of practice are not conforming (although surely the particular
aspiration cannot rightly be identified as a customary norm). Further, it is
understandable that a customary human right is subject to birth, growth,
other change, and death, depending upon patterns of expectation and
behavior that are recognizably generally conjoined in the ongoing social
process. 4 A human right, literally, is what we make of it.
9 See also Paust, supra note 7, at 12-18, 31, 38-41.
'oOn "thingification," see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811-15 (1935).
n1 See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 89.
12 Concerning this jurisprudential orientation, see, e.g., Paust, supra note 7, at 29, 35-37;
Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding of Content, Authority, and
Constitutional Choice, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 226,240-41,passim (1980). Professor Oscar Schachter
has utilized this orientation with respect to human rights guaranteed through the U.N. Charter.
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions
in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 652 (1951), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 40, 44 (2d ed. 1991).
13 See also Paust, supra note 12, at 242-50.
14 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 64-67.
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Despite occasional rhetorical flourish, universality of behavior and
unanimity are not required. Patterns of human practice need only be general,
not uniform, and patterns of opinio juris need only be generally shared."
Thus, a particular nation-state might disagree whether a particular human
right is customary and its governmental elites might even violate such a
norm, but it would still be bound if the norm is supported by patterns of
generally shared legal expectation and generally conforming behavior extant
in the community.16 If the patterns of violation become too widespread,
however, one of the primary bases of customary law can be lost. Similarly,
if it is no longer generally expected that a norm is legally appropriate or
required, the other base of customary law can be lost. When either base is
no longer generally extant, there can be no conjoining of general patterns of
legal expectation and behavior and, for such a social moment at least, a prior
customary law will no longer be operative.
For these reasons, both practice and opinio should be measured as
comprehensively as possible and with reference to relative stability or
change. With respect to opinio juris, it is suggested that the researcher
identify not merely how widespread a particular pattern of expectation is or
has been, but also how intensely held or demanded a particular norm is or
has been within the community. 7 Awareness of the degree and intensity
of general acceptance provides a more realistic approach to the identification
and clarification of normative content and should aid those who must apply
customary human rights law in making informed and rational choices. It
would also be useful to know how long such patterns of expectation have
existed, although a prior stability evident through time is no guarantee of
continued acceptance in the future and time is not otherwise a determinative
factor.1 It is possible, of course, to have a relatively recently widespread
and intensely held expectation that a human right is legally appropriate or
required and that such a pattern of opinio juris could form one of the
components of a new rule of customary international law, one that will even
be more stable in the future.
15 Id. at 63-64, and references cited. Cf. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (preferring that norms be "universal" or
"universally condemned"). Universality of expectation or unanimity are not required,
although the norm will be "universal" in obligation.
16 Paust, supra note 1, at 64-68 & nn.14-15, 76-77 & nn.30-31; LI=ICH, supra note 12,
at 89, 127.
' See Paust, supra note 1, at 63-64 & n.12, 73, 75-76.
t Id. at 64 n.13.
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One of the recent myths concerning opinio and customary law more
generally is that a "dissenter" is sometimes not bound by customary
international law, as if customary law sometimes, but not always, requires
the consent of each actor or participant that such law can reach. 9 In
another article, I have demonstrated why this recent claim and certain of its
permeations are shared only by a minority and are illogical, false, and
threatening to the nature of customary international law. 2 These observa-
tions pertain especially in connection with customary human rights and
related prohibitions of genocide and human rights in times of armed conflict
under humanitarian law.
In view of these recent claims, it is worth emphasizing that not only the
prohibitions of genocide, but also the rights and prohibitions contained in
treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions (many of which are viewed
as customary),21 as well as human rights treaties as such, are recognizably
of a higher status than ordinary international laws. As affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in 1970, certain obligations under international
law "are the concern of all States ... [and i]n view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection."' They are, the Court declared, obligatio erga omnes (obliga-
tions owing by and to all); and they include prohibitions of genocide and the
deprivation of "basic rights of the human person."'  To this list, especially
in view of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (which requires all
signatories "to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention[s] in all
circumstances" and in view of the universally obligatory criminal sanction
19 See id. at 64-65 n.14.
2' Id. at 65-67 n.14, 76-77.
21 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950) [hereinafter Geneva Civilian
Convention]. On the nature of most portions of the Geneva Conventions now as customary
law, see, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 1 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1163, 1170 (1993), approved by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 827 (1993), reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 1203, 1204 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War
Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 369-70 n.90 (1991). See also Theo van
Boven, General Course on Human Rights, 4 CoLLECFED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF
EUROPEAN LAW, Book #2, 1, 15 (1995) (common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
22 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Sp.), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Second
Phase) (Judgment of Feb. 5), quoted in RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 703, n.3.
2 Id.
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provisions (now part of customary international law),' one can safely add
war crimes covered by Geneva law.
Also significant with respect to the higher status and erga omnes nature
of several such treaties is the fact that neither termination nor suspension of
performance for material breach is available regarding "provisions relating
to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian
character," such as the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.' If rights and
obligations contained in such treaties are also customary, they retain the
obligatio erga omnes character recognized by the International Court
concerning "basic rights of the human person."
The prohibition of genocide is also a well-recognized example of a
peremptory norm jus cogens.26 Violations of fundamental human rights in
times of armed conflict or relative peace are also recognizably included .2
' See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 21, arts. 1, 146-47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518,
3616-18; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State
Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 93 & n.148 (1994); Jordan J. Paust, Universality
and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No U.S. Sanctuary for Alleged
Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337, 337-40 (1989); Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 21, 9H 35,
37-38.
25 Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 60(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. See also Geneva
Civilian Convention, supra note 21, arts. 1, 3, 27, 33, 148, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3536, 3538,
3618. With respect to genocide, Judge Elihu Lauterpacht has added: "The duty to 'prevent'
genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every other."
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. at para. 86 (Further
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Judge
Lauterpacht) [hereinafter I.C.J. Second Request].
26 See, e.g., I.C.J. Second Request, supra note 25, at para. 100; RESTATEMENT, supra note
3, § 702(a), cmts. d, n; 1 OPPENHEIM's INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 7-8, § 2;
Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 90, 92-94 n.3 (1989) (survey of textwriters included in other supporting evidence);
van Boven, supra note 21, at 15-16.
27 See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, § 702, cmt. n & n.1. See also MYRES S. McDOuGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274, 317-18, 341 (quoting JOHANN BLUNTSCHLI, MODERN LAW
OF NATIONs OF CrviLizED STATES (1867)), 360 (1980); Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of Jus
Cogens, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 81 (1991), extract reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY 119 (Anthony D'Amato ed. 1994); van Boven, supra note 21, at 15-16.
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For example, the customary jus cogens prohibitions recognized by the
Restatement include: genocide; slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing
the disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic
racial discrimination; and a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.28 More recently, the U.N.
Commission of Experts investigating international crimes in the former
Yugoslavia has reported that applicability of fundamental human rights
norms and the prohibition of genocide in that context is further assured by
"their character as peremptory norms of international law." 29
More generally, the erga omnes nature of customary human rights is
thought to be an added dimension assuring more clearly the universal nature
of the obligations involved. An additional assurance exists when particular
human rights are not merely erga omnes but also jus cogens, since these
2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §702 (a)-(g) and cmts. d, n; van Boven, supra note 21,
at 16 (general list), 26 & n.37 (democracy). In his remarks during the Colloquium, Professor
Louis Henkin noted that the list was "modest" and not exclusive, and that among the norms
he would add today would be those concerning individual autonomy and democracy. In terms
of actual judicial use of human right precepts in the United States over the last two hundred
years, the Restatement's list of what arguably are customary rights appears modest indeed.
See infra note 47; Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in
U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
543, 596-610 (1989) (documenting state and federal judicial use of numerous categories of
customary human rights that were also related to constitutional and statutory norms in over
1,000 cases during a period of more than 200 years). Concerning other categories of human
rights claimed in U.S. history, see, e.g., id. at 546-70, and references cited. See also Richard
B. Lilich, International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 2 F.S.U. J. TRANS. L. & POL. 1,
16, passim (1993); Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 93 (addressing the RESTATEMENT,
Schachter, Lillich and Meron); but see id. at 94-95.
Recently, the Human Rights Committee, under the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, identified a list of customary human rights mirrored in the covenant. See United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Human Rights Committee:
General Comment Adopted Under Article 40 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols, or in Relation to
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, General Comment No. 24(52), para. 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839 (1995).
2 Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 789 (1992), contained in Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, Annex,
at 15, 1 46, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
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norms are not merely universal but are also peremptory.30 Indeed, one
extra feature of customary jus cogens is the requirement that there exist a
general pattern of expectation that such norms are peremptory.' Clearly,
such patterns can and should be measured and, like customary law more
generally, they can be modified.32 In a real sense, jus cogens norms
represent a shared hope, demand, and expectation that certain values prevail
over others. They are the product of a process of choice in which we can
all participate.
The reality of individual participation is another important feature of
customary human rights law that is too often ignored or viewed less than
comprehensively. Imperfect forms of focus, if not limiting biases and
preferences, can lead to other false and inhibiting myths-myths that even
tend to serve and fit comfortably within a rigid state-oriented positivism that
is actually seriously opposed to several basic human rights and to the precept
of self-determination. 33 Part of this reality was rightly stressed at Nurem-
berg when the International Military Tribunal rejected defense claims "that
international law is concerned [merely] with the actions of sovereign states,
and provides no punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act
in question is an act of State, those who carry it out are not personally
responsible.... ."4 While necessarily stressing duties and criminal
sanctions as opposed to rights, the Tribunal recognized: "[t]hat international
law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has
long been recognized. '35 Rejecting the false myth that international law is
30 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 27, at 81-84.
31 Id. at 83-84 & n.21.
32 See id. at 82-85.
33 See, e.g., McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 73-75; Paust, supra note 12, at 267-74;
Jordan J. Paust, Authority: From a Human Rights Perspective, 28 AM. J. JuRIS. 64 (1983);
Jordan J. Paust, Remarks, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 126-30 (ASIL 1992); Jordan J. Paust, International
Legal Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of Governmental Power, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 1063 (1990). The inevitable revolution is democratic, with not only self-
determination, but also interdetermination.
' Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Oct. 1,
1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220 (1947).
3s Id. at 220. Clearly, there have been some state actor perpetrators (e.g., as in the case
of some war crimes). Clearly also, some perpetrators of international crime are private actors.
See, e.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (counterfeiting of foreign currency);
United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232, 235 (1844)
(piracy); United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464 (1840) (slave trade); United States v.
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merely state-to-state, the Tribunal also provided a recognition profoundly
relevant to the reality of human rights: "Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities. . . ." The same can be said
of violations of human rights law, although certainly many violators are
official elites who also claim to represent abstract entities. Further, as in the
case of international crime, most violations occur in the territory of a state,
although such actions are essentially of international concern. Clearly also,
most of the victims are individuals, and most of these are private individuals.
It is not difficult to understand, then, that patterns of practice involving
violations of international criminal law and human rights more generally are
not merely patterns involving interactions among States or state actors.
Individual participation in the creation and shaping of customary human
rights is less well-perceived, but no less real. All human beings recognizably
participate in a dynamic process of acceptance or expectation which leads to
The Garonne, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 73 (1837) (same); United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat.) 467 (1826) (violence against charge d' affaires); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153 (1820) (piracy); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159 (1795) (Iredell, J.,
concurring) ("piracies and trespasses committed against the general law of nations");
Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116-17 (1784) (assault on foreign consul);
Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a) (slave trade); United
States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (private war, breach of
neutrality); United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598) (assault
on a foreign minister (secretary of a legation)); United States v. Hand, 26 F. Cas. 103 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297) (assault on charge d' affaires); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (breach of neutrality); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797)
(violation of territorial rights); I Op. Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796) (breach of neutrality); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) ("acts of hostility," breach of neutrality, offense "against the public
peace"); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International law Under the FSIA and the Act of State
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 211-12 nn.76-80 (1983) (violence against ambassadors,
pirates, poisoners, assassins, incendiaries, banditti, brigands, slave trade, breaches of
neutrality).
Additionally, offenses against human rights recognized in particular treaties often reach
private perpetrators (as well as private victims). See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Aggression Against
Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide And Other Crimes Against Human Rights,
18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 283, 291-92 & nn.55-61; see also infra note 58.
' Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, Oct. 1,
1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
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patterns of opinio juris measurable at various moments.37 Participation in
the shaping of attitudes is a social fact, whether or not such participation is
actually recognized by each individual or is as effective as it might otherwise
be (e.g., even if apathetic "inaction" is the form of participation for some, a
form that simply allows others a more significant role). Actors may also
have a more significant role in any given social context because of relatively
higher respect, power, enlightenment, skill, wealth, and so forth; but such
relative outcomes (or "value positions" at any given moment) are tied to the
dynamics of the social process in which all participate, however directly or
indirectly or seemingly integrated, dominated or alienated. The same can be
said of state actors. Indeed, the same recognitions apply to participation in
the creation of patterns of human practice or behavior, the other element of
customary law.
Since each nation-state, indeed each human being, is a participant in both
the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of dynamic customary human rights
law, each may initiate a change in such law, or, with others, reaffirm its
validity. Indeed, such a law at least, born of what people think and do, is
constantly reviewed and "re-enacted" in the social process, changed, or
terminated. The decisions of governmental elites are especially subject to a
constant "process of review" in which all can participate. As Myres
McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and Michael Reisman remarked:
Most of us are performing... these ... roles without being
fully aware of the scope and consequences of our acts.
Because of this, our participation is often considerably less
effective than it might be. Every individual cannot, of
course, realistically expect or demand to be a decisive factor
in every major decision. Yet the converse feeling of
pawnlike political impotence, of being locked out of
effective decisions, is an equally unwarranted orientation.
The limits of the individual's role ... [are] as much a
function of his passive acquiescence and ignorance of the
potentialities of his participation as of the structures of the
complex human organizations of the contemporary world.38
37 See, e.g., LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTIoN TO CONTEMPORY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A POLICY-ORmNTED PERsPECrIvE 76-81 passim (1989); MCDOUGAL Bl" AL., supra note 27,
at 73-74, 80 n.208, 81, 86, 88-89, 96-107, 167-68, 173-79, 207-16, 269, 413, 416,471; Paust,
supra note 1, at 59-63, and references cited.
3 Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 193 (1968).
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Moreover, it is the reality of participation in processes of expectation and
practice which allows one to recognize that individuals are not merely
objects of customary international law, but are also participants in the
creation, shaping and termination of such law;39 that patterns of "domestic"
practice are relevant, not merely practice state-to-state or at the international
level;' and that the related pretense of British positivism at the start of the
41 *,twentieth century, widely opposed42 but adopting several false myths,
was perhaps substantially as unreal then as it would be now despite the many
more formal institutional arrangements for individual and group participation
at the international level and recognition today of a growing interaction and
interdependence of individuals, groups, and public and private institutions in
all social, economic, and political sectors. Need one stress, customary
human rights law is neither made purely by actions, and/or the opinio, of
"States," nor merely by national governmental actors within a federated
system.43 Similarly, the international legal process is not simplistically a
purely horizontal system or radically decentralized."
A related myth that human rights law did not begin until after the
See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 59-72; supra note 37; infra notes 42, 47-48.
o See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 67-72, and references cited; Simma & Alston, supra
note 4, at 92 (addressing Schachter's recognition); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note
27, at 367, passim; supra note 37. But see Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 99-100
(assuming that "customary international law can only be triggered, and continue working, in
situations in which States interact" and that state-to-state interaction is "essential").
"' See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 288-292, at 362-69 (2d ed. 1912).
Some assume that British positivism reflected a "traditional" view (see, e.g., LILUCH, supra
note 12, at 31-32, 64, 88, 90; but see id. at 35), but such was radically opposed to 18th and
early 19th century Western-and American-views and was also seriously opposed even at
the start of the 20th century (infra note 42). Further, it was widely known that "nations" are
different than States and were also capable of creating treaty-based international law. See,
e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 60 n.4.
42 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 28, at 620-25, 647-49 & nn.601-02.
43 See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 4, at 84-85, quoting Isabelle R. Gunning,
Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L
L. 211, 221-22 (1991); supra note 39. But see Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties
and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 99 (1995-96) [hereinafter Weisburd I]; Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1995) (ignoring U.S.
"contributions" and "participation" through inaction, acceptance or apathy), 12 (ignoring
realistic roles of states within a federated system as well as "inhabitants").
4 But see Weisburd I, supra note 43.
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atrocities of World War IV5 involves confusion of the rarity of direct
individual remedies at the international level with a perceived lack of
rights.' History demonstrates that such a perception is too simplistic.
Actual patterns of opinio juris and practice concerning human rights are far
more complex and provide evidence of a rich history of individual rights and
remedies, although further research of human rights in Europe, Latin
America and other areas prior to the twentieth century is still needed.
Traditional international law demonstrates that remedies at the international
level were primarily state-controlled; but within the overall process, domestic
courts and other remedial processes were expected to and did play a role
with respect to individual claims and sanctions. ' This is especially evident
in a detailed documentation of the history of the use of human rights in the
United States." Further, at the international level, human rights claims of
individuals and groups were often pressed indirectly by States by various
45 See 1 OPPENHEM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, § 377, at 849-50, § 431, at
984-85; LnilcH, supra note 12, at 1, 5, 33-34, 88, 90; but see id. at 5, 35 (nationals within
a state had human rights related protections regarding humanitarian intervention, abolition of
slavery, laws of war, protection of minorities), 169. See generally, LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 155 (1972); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
601 (3d ed. 1993) ('The Nuremberg Charter applied [what was already] a customary
international law of human rights in charging the Nazi war criminals, inter alia, with 'crimes
against humanity.' "); Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 399 (1995-96); infra notes 46-49.
' See Paust, supra note 28, at 632 & n.539. See also id. at 648-49 & nn.601-02.
' See, e.g., L=LuCH, supra note 12, at 35, 44 (Schachter); Paust, supra note 28, at 546-
611, 615 n.479 passim. With respect to early use of human rights precepts and claims in
Europe, Latin American, and other areas outside the United States, see MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 3-6 passim; Paust, supra note 28, at 547-48, 554-55, 556 n.74, 561 n.11,
567-70, 647-49 nn.601-02; Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrTANICA,
extract reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 27, at 21-24. See also
THOMAS BuERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 1, 5 (1988); Louis
B. Sohn, Keynote Address: Proposals for the Future, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 414,
420 (1990) (line of cases and precepts from 1910 to 1990). Especially in the Americas and
Europe, generally shared and growing demands and expectations concerning human rights
were also transposed into domestic constitutions, statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions
for more effective protection in the arenas where most human rights deprivations still occur.
Transnational and international influences were complex and dynamic; and such interstimula-
tion is still ongoing, especially as modern human rights instruments are themselves transposed
into domestic laws or produce indirect effects. See also Lillich, supra note 28, at 1.
48 Paust, supra note 28, at 546-611 passim.
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means and in various formal and informal sanction processes.49
This last point is relevant in defeating another myth, that the process of
sanctions for violations of human rights is in some sense singular, operates
merely state-to-state, and is functional only through formal institutional
arrangements that look much like domestic police, courts, and jails. Another
simplistic and imposed notion is that sanctions operate only through
coercion,' a notion often related to a less than comprehensive awareness
of processes and strategies of coercion as well as actual processes of
authority. In contrast, the seminal study by Myres McDougal, Harold
Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen-" provides a comprehensive framework for
inquiry into various sanction processes and strategies of a diplomatic,
ideologic, economic, and "military" nature. 52 The "process of review"
noted above can also be conceived as part of a comprehensive process of
sanctions whereby official elite actions are "reviewed" and responded to by
our actions and inactions.53
Knowing this, one can recognize various forms of individual and group
participation in both public and predominantly private sanctions; and one
might devise more effective strategies of a political, economic of "military"
nature implicating perhaps resources or processes concerning respect,
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, and power-5 Private institutions,
groups, and individuals have been involved in various forms of sanction
strategy concerning human rights for at least the last two hundred years."
They have used diplomatic, ideologic, economic, and/or "military" strategies
to promote one or many sanction objectives such as prevention, deterrence,
restoration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and correction.56 For example, the
" See, e.g., LILLICH, supra note 12, at 1-3, 35; Paust, supra note 28, at 566, 570, 615
n.479; 648-49 nn.601-02.
30 See, e.g., Weisburd I, supra note 43.
-" Supra note 27.
52 Id. at 219-47, 551-60 passim.
53 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Prologue to Decision Concerning
Private Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STuD. 79, 82-83 passim (1977).
' See id. at 83-87, 94-114; supra note 52.
55 See, e.g., MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 173-79, 192 passim; Paust, supra note
28, at 546-611, 648-49 n.602.
5 See, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 309-32 (1961); supra note 55. Prevention, as a sanction objective,
is an effort to prevent occurrence of impermissible conduct. Deterrence, like prevention,
seeks to prevent occurrence of impermissible conduct, but "is concerned with a threat or
challenge ... that has emerged and been clearly posed and imminently promised."
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current roles played by many human rights groups are notorious. 7 Beyond
diplomacy, education, use of the media, networking, other efforts to clarify
and disseminate information, lobbying, advising, drafting, testifying or
witnessing, investigating, invoking, and what Professor Henkin referred to
as "mobilizing shame," private human rights groups have been and might be
involved in economic and "military" strategies to promote various sanction
objectives. More generally, like all participants in sanction processes, they
aid in the shaping of attitudes and behavior concerning human rights and
help even to condition the unlawful exercise of power. The power of public
protest and the sanction of public opinion, for example, can be particularly
significant for prevention, deterrence, restoration, and reconstruction.
A slightly different myth is that human rights duties flow merely to the
State or those acting as official elites. In another study, it is shown that
private duties of individuals or groups can and do exist under human rights
law, that nearly all human rights instruments today provide express or
implied recognition of private duties, and that inquiry should shift from
whether there are private duties to what sorts of duty correspond to what
sorts of right in what context, how competing rights should be accommodat-
ed, and how these ultimately affect public responsibility."8
Finally, with respect to evidences of customary human rights, the reality
of individual and group participation as well as the role of actual patterns of
human expectation and behavior demonstrate that numerous evidences are
Deterrence "envisages the influencing of the decision that the potential violator will make by
affecting his expectations of how the sanctioner will behave and respond." Restoration
involves "the application of responding coercion for the purpose of compelling the violator
to reduce" or stop the unlawfully initiated conduct. Rehabilitation involves the "reparation
of the destruction of values" suffered because of the unlawfully initiated conduct.
Reconstruction designates the "long-term purpose of avoiding the recurrence of prohibited
coercion by modifying or reorganizing or eliminating particular structures and processes...
within the violator state (area) .. " Correction is a sanction strategy directed against
particular persons in order to subject such persons to corrective deprivations; e.g., as with a
criminal penalty.
" See generally CHEN, supra note 37, at 65-75; LILLICH, supra note 12, at 65-6, 69, 192-
93, 344-57, 371, 900-01, 912; MCDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 27, at 145, 173-76, 226-27,
255, 259-61, 264-65, 269, 282-86, 313; Paust, supra note 1, at 73 n.23.
'" See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights
Law, 5 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 51 (1992). See also McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 27, at xviii
(reminding more generally that "there is a human rights dimension to every interaction in the
shaping and sharing of values, and this dimension includes in varying constellations effects
upon the outcomes of all values."), 96, 807-10, 585, 587, 592-93; supra notes 35, 45.
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relevant and should be investigated.59 One notorious and well-accepted role
concerning the identification and clarification of customary law is that
engaged in by private textwriters,6 including the testimony or affidavits of
textwriters.6 ' Similarly, private conferences, codes, and reports can be used
to identify and clarify customary norms.62 With respect to general practice,
it is also important to note that "inaction" or compliance because of a choice
to not violate a norm may often be more relevant than the nonconforming
practice of a few violators of the norm, and yet such a practice may be
difficult to measure.63
As recognized in another study, knowing what behavioral patterns should
be measured and what should not be unduly emphasized, however, can also
have important consequences with respect to research and choice about the
formation, change and termination of customary law." Too often textwrit-
ers argue that the death of a norm, even a treaty norm, has occurred because
of the actions of a few States.65 Instead, what should be investigated are
the patterns of expectation more generally extant concerning human rights
(including those even of such law violators), and the actions and inactions
of all participants. It is also too simplistic to argue that law violations
which, in a relatively less formally organized community, have not been
subject to effective sanctions have, therefore, necessarily led to the demise
of a customary norm. It would be ludicrous to argue, for example, that
when a law-violating official elite of a State knows that its actions are
prohibited by customary human rights law, when others generally expect that
such conduct is and remains illegal, and when violations are scarce, the
customary norm is obviated by a failure effectively to ensure sanctions
against such an elite. Even in a relatively formally organized community the
lack of effective sanctions against several law violators (e.g., several of those
who commit murder) does not necessarily lead one to the conclusion that a
norm (e.g., the prohibition of murder) has thereby been obviated (although
widespread patterns of murder can break down the prohibition).
-" See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 68-75, and references cited.
60 See, e.g., id. at 68-70 & n. 17; Sohn, supra note 45.
61 Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving International Human Rights Law in
Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (1995-96); Paust, supra
note 1, at 72, 73 n.24; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5307 (D. Mass. 1995).
6 Paust, supra note 1, at 72-73 nn.22-23.
3 Id at 76-77 & n.31.
6 Id. at 77.
6See also id. at 67-68 n.15, 76-77 & n.31.
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Suppose, for example, that genocidal violations of human rights law are
occurring in four countries with either the conspiratorial or complicitous
involvement of three other States. Assume also that most private and official
perpetrators know or should know that such acts are illegal under customary
international law and that, once caught, they could even suffer criminal
sanctions. Additionally, the general populations in such countries are split
as to whether or not such conduct should be supported, but a majority
supports genocide in only three of the seven countries, and in all but two the
majority expects that genocide is unlawful. Further, the official elites in
these countries are divided as to whether or not such acts should be lawful
in the future, but a majority of officials from two States openly and formally
presses two sorts of claim: (1) that their actions are recognized exceptions,
and (2) that there should be such exceptions in the future." The United
Nations General Assembly has formally condemned genocide and singled out
actions in one such country. Similarly, the U.N. Security Council has issued
resolutions condemning such acts in the same country, imposing economic
sanctions, and calling for an end to such acts and the complicitous, if not
conspiratorial, acts of two outside States.67 To date, genocide continues in
each of the four countries.
Given widespread and intensely held expectations among humankind (even
in some of the countries where violations occur) that genocidal violations of
human rights are unlawful under customary international law and the patterns
of general practice within and outside the United Nations (including patterns
of public and private compliance with the prohibition of genocide), it would
be, to say the least, unreal to conclude that the unabated actions of a few
violators has led to the demise of a customary norm prohibiting genocide or
that the violators have somehow opted out or can lawfully avoid the reach
of such law and various future sanctions. The actions of perpetrators and
complicitors from seven States certainly cannot be controlling patterns of
6See also id. at 67-68 n.15.
67 By analogy, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Dec.
S/RES/787 (1992); S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
(1992); S.C. Res. 779, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3118th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES1779 (1992);
S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESf/71 (1992), all reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 1470-71, 1474-77, 1481-85 (1992). The Security Council also reaffirmed: "that
any taking of territory by force or any practice of 'ethnic cleansing' is unlawful and
unacceptable, and will not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on
constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina .. " S.C. Res. 787,
supra at para. 2.
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practice, nor do they mirror general and controlling patterns of opinio juris
in a community of some one hundred and eighty States unless they happen
to represent the majority of humankind.
Even if there were no "coercive" efforts made by States or official state
elites at the United Nations or elsewhere to oppose such genocidal acts and
official elite actions were cynical, hypocritical, and even functionally
complicitous in part, the facts of general practice in compliance and
widespread opinio juris would remain and the customary norm would retain
its validity. Additionally, the fact that such violators and their supporters are
(along with all other actors in the international legal process) law creators
does not simplistically compel the conclusion that those who participate in
the creation of law are not bound by law currently extant."
Human rights are too important to be left with the State. Realistic inquiry
into the complex nature, sources, and evidences of customary human rights
law demonstrates that they are not and that they are meant to be real rights
of real human beings. Private individual, group, and institutional participa-
tion in processes of expectation and behavior is a social, political, and
legally-relevant fact, as well as participation by public regional and
international institutions. Awareness of these forms of participation can help
one to avoid fallacious myth and to guide realistic inquiry not merely
concerning identification and clarification of human rights, duties, competen-
cies and responsibilities, but also with respect to violations of human rights
law and various sanction processes, strategies, and possibilities.
Finally, although genocidal violations of human rights have been rampant
and largely unabated in Bosnia-Herzegovina,6 9 it would be ludicrous to
argue that such conduct has now become permissible. Indeed, how many
will view "Schindler's List" and leave the theater thinking that genocide in
Europe, now or in 1944 in the former Yugoslavia, is or was then permissible
under international law? And how many are or will be violators? Few, and
we pray, very few.
" See supra note 65.
69 See, e.g., supra note 67; Conference on Changing Notions of Sovereignty and the Role
of Private Actors in International Law, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
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